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Abstract
In the following essay I shall venture on the ocean of metaphor, reducing the rashness
of this project by the use of the well-worn boat of philosophy. I shall ask four questions:
1. Is it possible to realise metaphor through thought, action or emotion? 2. What is the
opposite of metaphor? 3. Does an alternative to metaphorical thinking exist? 4. Does an
alternative metaphorical thinking exist? However, should my project fail, perhaps the
raft of metaphor itself might carry me safe to the island ruled by Ariel and Prospero, and
where other shipwrecked once were met with soft music.
1. Tree types of metaphors
Let me begin with three examples of the phenomenon of metaphor, the
two first ones originating in philosophy, the last one being an invention
of my own:
The german philosopher, Hans Lipps (of great inspiration to K. E.
Løgstrup), spoke about “Sicht” (“sight”), which both refers to optics
and to shooting, meaning the anticipated, imagined or intended content
of perception.1 Perhaps, it is relevant to remind about the fact that Pla-
to, in his dialogue “Cratylus”, remarks that the concept of doxa, “mean-
ing”, often, “not-demonstrative”, “uncertain” knowledge, originates in
a metaphor from archery, toxon - anyhow, if we are prone to believe in
Socrates. This is also the case with the concepts of “intention”, bou-
le ¤, “wish”, boulesthai, as well as “plan”, bouleuesthai; they all der-
ive from bole ¤, “shooting”.2 Thus, the metaphor of “sight/aim”, to
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indicate the anticipation of the meaning of experience through intentio-
nality, was already conceptualised by Plato. Similarly the metaphor of
the Stoic philosophers would be “tonos”, “tension”, and “skopos”,
“aim”. But “skopos” would be contrasted with “telos”, the latter rela-
ting to an aim of the person which is realised through the very wish of
doing the good, while the former relates to a kind of realisation where
an actual change in the “real world” is necessitated. “Telos” is an ethi-
cal concept concentrating on the state of mind only, “skopos” involves
the effects of the good act.3 So, the latter would converge with the con-
cept of “intentum” in Husserl’s theory of intentionality - while “tonos”
would answer to “intentio”.
In “Philosophical Investigations” Ludwig Wittgenstein says that “the
word watches us”: it is just as alien, strange, full of secrets, like a pic-
ture, and to a high degree, not anything that belongs to us. 
“Though - one would like to say - every word has a different character
in different contexts, at the same time there is one character it always
has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us. - But a face in a painting
looks at us too.” 4
The fan is a special kind of metaphor. Inside the fans of the baroque and
the rococo ages pictures were painted or texts written that emerged in
different, but wonderful ways, when the fan was opened in front of the
face, almost a “mobile”. This is a metaphor of reflectivity. Also, the
outside of the fan differed from the inside - like the structure of human
experience. But at the same time the fan is a prolongation of the arm, it
is an instrument of gestures, of the possible grace in hiding and uncov-
ering, of more than a functional toil for cooling the passions that emerge
on the outside of the face, on the skin. So in a way, a fan is an inter-
changeable tattooing, substituting the skin and usually being just as
transparent and light in its bottom colour as this arch-human clothing.
But most of all, perhaps, it is a projectionable eyelid and hence a widen-
ing of sight?  
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The Nazis were supposed to make not only lamp shades, but fans, of
human skin, too. Can one realise a metaphor? Does this possibility bel-
ong to despotism and/or madness? Or is this only an absurd example of
something utterly important, not only to the use of language, but to
living?
A metaphor has got all these metaphorical qualities mentioned: it is
an image controlling intentionality, and hence, investing the word with
the sensual marks of experience. It is a mixture of word and image ali-
en to us, to such a degree, that it can function almost like an object, and
hence “watch” us, in the way not only Wittgenstein, but Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty, too, claimed that the things were watching the painter paint-
ing them.5 A metaphor is a fan, unfolding a world of sense, a sensitive
world, inviting us to the mating dance like the feather-fan of the pea-
cock, and at the very same time concealing this world, the place, and its
birds’ face, close to a mask.
2. The essence of metaphor
In this essay I am going to present some thoughts - the word “argue”
would be too pretentious - transgressing the vague (and extremely com-
mon, post-modern) notion that metaphor were nothing but a postponing
of meaning, by playing a game where concrete and abstract significan-
ces are shifting their place by turns. A fact everybody seems to know
since Derrida6: the impossible game of the basic meaning, of the
arche¤-sense. A game, however, already suggested by Aristotle when
he presents us to three related functions of this pragmatic figure in Art
of Rhetoric:
1. A metaphor is exactly the alien, strange (xenikon) word in the com-
forting sequence of the known-all-too-known speech. Aristotle phrases
it so beautifully:
“It is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity, pleasure, and a foreign
air, and it cannot be learned from anyone else;” 7
111
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty: L’Oeil et l’esprit. Paris: Gallimard. 1964.
6 J. Derrida: La voix et le phénomène. P.U.F. Paris 1967. And J. Derrida: Marges de
la philosophie. Paris 1972.
7 Aristotle: Art of Rhetoric. Loeb-Udgaven. Transl. by R. H. Freese. London: Harvard
University Press 1994(1926). III, ii, 8-9, 14051a).
2. But metaphor is not only the foreign bird in the duck pond, just for a
while concealing the “Heimat” of its devouring beauty, it is more than
the imagery of the shy peacock, a legible bird, for all that. It is far more
than that, because it casts the shadow of Otherness, in which the secret
of words is preserved:
“And generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for
metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is
clever.” 8
3. However, a metaphor stands in the middle of our being-together,
exposing its beauty, expropriating the beauty of sound, i.e., of the word,
and the beauty of what it might mean, or the smell and the taste of this
word. A Venus born, not by the sea, but a creature of saliva and smelly
breath. 
“Metaphors therefore should be derived from what is beautiful either
in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense.”
(ibid.).
How is one to summarise?
An alien, an enigma, beauty, passing the rose or the hand grenade for
ever and ever, escaping into dreams, and into dreams of dreams, a “ro-
tunda”...coming terrifying close to a circulus vitiosus; the never ending
figure of the never ending figure, of the... Let me give a little example: 
The word “blank”, meaning “bright”, is a Low German word that,
when borrowed by the French language, comes to mean “white”
(blanc), and hence, in the English, acquires the sense of “clean”. One
may ask: is it the touch of fingertips, or the scrutinising eye, through
which the lack of something is observed? Or does it happen to be the
lack of letters, of signs, of any trace of the human, vestigium absentum.
Are “clean”, and “bright”, and “blank”, and “white”, positive qualities,
or do they testify to a lack? The lack of fingerprints, is that brightness?
This is already a metaphorical expression, is it not? Because so many
other things could lack on a surface? And if we proceed to the SHARP-
NESS of the bright, then we are definitely already inside the realm of
the figurative!
However, the bottom seems hard to reach: “white”, they say, “is the
fusion of all colours.”
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From a rather naive, objectivist point of view, we must be able to
observe the concrete “first”, from which the transference to the abstract
level must proceed - following the usual definition of “metaphor” as a
transference of a “name” from one field to another,9 most often from
the concrete to the abstract, and rarely without the use of images.  
However, in order to answer this question, we should be able to
explain how the connection between the word, as a sound, as the prac-
tice of voice, and that towards which the sound is directed, is establish-
ed. But the latter is the articulation of sense, of all the senses, that bun-
dle of gestures reaching towards the world. Voice, then, and hence,
sound, has to imitate (mime¤sis) these other dimensions of experience.
So, unless some intrinsic criterion of deep union is presupposed, the
voice is metaphoric in its very essence, i.e., it cannot mean what we
hear. 
The origin of language in the onomatopo(i)etic relation, in a depict-
ing sound - the Stoic version -, and hence, in insistence on a deep fami-
liarity between sound and world, cannot be generalised. If language
might be thought of as directly connected to being, this notion is soon
abolished by small powerful words like “and”, “not”, “therefore” and
“perhaps”. But in this void between sound and world, occupied by the
force of convention, “xyntike¤”, as Aristotle named it, metaphor is the
only money to pay the bill of denotation.10 However, the price is the
need to exchange. So far, as there exists no Bretton Woods agreement in
the realm of sense, and hence, no gold of significance, the metaphor flo-
ats. 
So, there is no sense in seeking for the authenticity of metaphorical
expression - as even Nietzsche still seemed to believe.11 The senses let
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us down, precisely because they in their blossoming benevolence cre-
ate, due to a transcendental co-operation, the very image of a mutual
catalysis, the real, which they then are summoned, against justice, one
by one, to confess to, on their own.
The metaphor is too “creative”, too “keen” on reality: either it anti-
cipates it, and at the end proves unable to render it as anything else but
its own “aim”. The pray was the work of shadows. Or it cannot help to
substitute itself for the reality to which it did refer with so many prom-
ises. In the end it has to fold up the fan, because the act was finished. 
But when the search for the soundness of meaning by hand of metap-
hor is in vain, is there any option left?
Perhaps, to reverse the order of epistemological necessity: to ask for
the realising of metaphor.
But what could this mean? 
3. Beauty as liberation from the rule of metaphor
A realised metaphor is “ein Unding”, because the realised seems to
cancel symbolism. Of course, a realised dream might still be metaphor-
ical, in so far as the island in the stream and the daiquiris might be
interpreted to refer to something beyond the sun, the breeze and the baf-
fling - if we want to save the author from hedonism, from escapism, or
even from a not unusual kind of existential stupidity. “Realise”, origin-
ating in the term “realitas” during scholasticism, shall not be interpret-
ed in the spirit of Greek or modern thinking, as if it meant “essentia” or
even “existentia (ens)”, in the abstract. It just and simply means “res”,
“thing”, and hence through this thing indicating a possible essence and
existence. The name sounded here, is John Duns Scotus, “Meisterden-
ker” of the scholastic period, who coined the term “haecceitas” (later
borrowed by Peirce and Heidegger - the latter re-named it “Faktizität”),
meaning “a reality of that which is inaccessible to conceptualisation” -
the opposite of Thomas Aquinas’ concept of “quidditas”. The thing pre-
sents itself through the grid of language by its name, and due to this
very name, the sound or the letters, it is able to conceal itself. So, “das
Konkrete” might be a metaphor, after all. But of what, then? Of itself!
Then, “realitas”, and, hence, the realised metaphor, might suggest
metaphysics, because the non-metaphorical is approaching us. I do not
mean as a language in the sense of Hilbert, without anything but con-
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tingent symbols, or a language of the mind, consisting of mental states
of signification’s immune to linguistics advances - like the epistemo-
logical dream of Husserl and some perplexed souls within Cognitive
Science. I am hinting at something quite else. In “Le diable et le bon
dieu” by J.-P. Sartre, from 1951, the central characters, Goetz and
Catherine, exchange the following words:
“Goetz: Je prendrai la ville.
Catherine: Mais pourqui?
Goetz: Parce que c’est mal.
Catherine: Et pourquoi faire le Mal?
Goetz: Parce que le Bien est déjà fait.
Catherine: Qui l’a fait?
Goetz: Dieu le Pére. Moi, j’invente.”12
God and the Devil, the arch-metaphors of Western culture, but somet-
hing emerges beyond triviality, the Evil as an invention. God inhabits
the symbolic realm, St. Augustine testifies to that, when he speaks of
his “verbum mentis”, in his “De trinitate”, “word of the mind”, “the real
aim”, the true “telos”, whispered by God. However, inventions are new,
they are something that never were in this world before, so we can
presuppose that they do not already have to be caught in the bands of
analogies, emulations...13 If the thing, even the thing in itself, the
abstract “thing-ness”, cannot function as the straightforward negation
of metaphor, could it then be thought of that the NEW thing were able
to challenge metaphora? No, because the brand new thing is a genuine
metaphor - how else, on earth, should we be able to conceive of it, if not
by analogy? An absurd “deduction” (or is it an “abduction”) from thing
to concept, and from concept to thing. We have to anticipate it through
an aiming, a “Sicht”, “bule¤”, “tonos” an intentionality. And no inten-
tionality without “intentio” and “intentum”, the game between “tonos”,
“tension” and “skopos”, “the aim” - both concepts necessarily existing
as moods in a mind - however blurred the conception of this aim might
be. In addition to these philosophical reflections, it might be noticed
that the brand new thing is almost bursting of promises, brave new
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worlds, invocations of victories and of happiness, metaphors of a life
lacking a serious concept of “living”.   
The Devil, then, has to have a function - Goethe taught us that - to
make thought real, to transform thinking into action, to transfer dreams
to life; and in this connection his task must be to make it possible to rea-
lise metaphor. But to realise metaphor is to lead it out of the symbolic
realm. However, what is outside this realm but the things without essen-
ces? Not, exactly, the things in this world without names, what Demo-
crit called “no¤nymon” - like a face only shaved at the one cheek - this
scornful shaving that the master-thief did to the drunken guards in the
story by Herodot about the king’s treasure -, or an outburst of laughter
while you are crying. What concerns us here are the things without
“ousia”, not only deprived of essence, but without what we in acknowl-
edging its widest possible connotations call “substance”. This must be
the only reason of a metaphor to sell itself to the devil. But I am afraid
that in order to find such an exemplar we have to listen to the favourite
victims of the Devil, and turn to the things that are breathing and sweat-
ing. We must turn to the human beings. Because every inorganic thing
steals its essence from the word that denotes it, and even more, the more
it tries to resist this denotation. 
So far, the line of thought went like this: in search of the strictly non-
metaphorical, the conditions, of course, to talk about metaphor at all,
we descended to the bottom of the earth (searching for the “grounded-
ness” of thought, thought coming close to a game with metaphors),
looking into Limbo, and met the Devil who presented us to the what did
appear as the only notion left: “a thing without essence”. Finally, we
learnt that this had to be a human being - because animals, indeed, have
souls.
Now, we shall meet Don Giovanni and Sarastro, and Mozart and
Schopenhauer, dancing, the one with a magic flute, the other with a
magician’s pug. But let us, just on the threshold of these universes of
heavenly music, quote Immanuel Kant:
Immanuel Kant introduces the concept of thinking as magic, becau-
se magic shall arise passion, magic is a play with passion. In “Kritik der
Urteilskraft”, his “Aesthetics”, his last great work (however, not in his
earlier epistemology, nor in his moral philosophy), in Paragraph 21, he
reduces the concept of reality, the common sense, to a “Gemeinsinn”, a
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“collective sense” the core of which is emotion: because emotion only,
guarantees the possibility of communication: 
“If insights (“Erkenntnisse”) should be able to be communicated
(“mitteilen lassen”), then it must also be possible to communicate the
mood (“Gemütszustand”), i.e., the emotional motivation (“Stim-
mung”) of the faculties of knowledge towards an insight (“zu einer
Erkenntnis”) at all, and hence in that proportion needed to such a con-
ception (through which we are able to conceptualise an object), in
order thereby to create knowledge; because without this (emotional
motivation. OFK) as a subjective condition of knowledge, this knowl-
edge would not be able to emerge as an effect.”14
Immanuel Kant also speaks, in Paragraph 40, about three kinds of rea-
soning:
1. Autonomous thinking
2. Empathy: to be able to think as if you were any other person.
3. At any time to be able to think in harmony with yourself. 
So, then, let us use, for a moment, the metaphor of “harmony” - striking
Plato’s use of the word “skopos” in “The Sophist” (228C),15 where the
Elean Stranger says :
“Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and dis-
ease of the soul.” 
And where he continues: 
“But if things which partake of motion and aim at (“skopon”) some
particular mark pass beside the mark and miss it on every occasion
when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through
right proportion to one another, or, on the contrary, through dispropor-
tion?” (ibid.). 
Let us listen to this great Western metaphor of the right mental aiming
(“skopon”, ibid.), of “Einstimmigkeit”, and go right to the core: if there
can exist discord and disproportion within the mind, then a mind
without sound at all might exist too. So, the thing without an essence
which we are searching for, might be a human being without a mood,
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without a tune, i.e., without any possibility of being in harmony with
himself.   This lack of essence of the “thing” cannot consist in thinking,
nor in the thinking of thinking, “noe¤sis noe¤seo¤s”, as Aristotle cal-
led it in “De anima”, thought devouring itself from its tail like a starved
snake. Because man is permanently absorbed “in” some kind of thin-
king, because he is permanently absorbed in perceiving. The thing
without a mood is a person that thinks without emotions. The empty
place can only be the place from where man comes to action, from his
heart. 
“Mi par che abbiate un’anima di bronzo”16 says Leporello to Don
Giovanni. And Don Giovanni is fetched to the underworld by a statue,
a figure of stone, “Venne un colosso...Guisto là, il diavolo sel trangu-
giò”.17
But the very last words of Leporello are: “Vero è l’evento”, (what did
happen was true). So, we are left to believe that Leporello is the author
of the story, and, more important, that Don Giovanni is his metaphor. 
“Voglio fare il gentiluomo, e non voglio più servir.”18 Don Giovanni
is Leporello’s heart of stone. So, perhaps the notion of the empty soul
does refer figuratively after all, not freeing us from metaphor.  
But what about Papageno? Very differently, I should think, because
while Leporello is the demiurg, the half-god, creating the place where
any humanity ends, making even the reconciliation of music vain,
Papageno is the innocent witness. He is the drunken voice in the mid-
night choir, the choir of Aristotle’s tragedy, the ever commenting voice.
But the voice needed to create “harmony” (Einstimmigkeit). But is
Papageno a human being.
“Tamino: Sagt mir, du lustiger Freund, wer bist du?”
Papageno: Wer bin ich? Dumme Frage! Ein Mensch, wie du.”
And immediately after that, Papageno asks Tamino:
“gibt’s ausser diesen Bergen auch noch Länder und Menschen?”
“Viele tausende...” answers Tamino: “das Fremde”, “the foreign”,
“allotria”, “no xenos”, the world invoked by metaphor, following Ari-
stotle. And the enigma that Sarastro incorporates, the labyrinth to free-
dom from gender and social identity, the liberty to be “ein Mensch, der
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den Menschen liebt”; the right to take possession of a heart. 
Then, if discord and disproportion, emptiness, even a void in the soul
can exist, the accord, concord, harmony, seems to be able to exist too,
and, finally, beauty, the handshake of Amadeus: the beauty. But what
beauty? The beauty of what? The beauty of the beautiful soul, combin-
ing passion, mercy..., “Unless I be relieved by prayer; Which pierces so,
that it assaults Mercy itself, and frees all faults. As you from crimes
would pardon’d be, Let your indulgence set me free.”  
The empty heart might, for all that, not be the opposite of metaphor.
Its real opposition could be a passion instead, but that kind of passion,
which is compassion. Even a compassion with the foreign and strange.
The aspects of metaphor incorporating a gesture of “a foreign air” of the
“enigma”, as Aristotle mentioned, might be in accordance with the third
parameter, with beauty, but with the beauty of the soul belonging to him
that speaks in the right way: from the heart. Compassion could be able
to reflect a harmony of the soul that as a state of emotion does not need
any further interpretation. It might be quite the opposite of a hole in the
soul, in might be a pouring over, an emanation. Hence, it might be a
state of the mind without the difference between sign and signification
that is presupposed by any metaphorical expression. But what would
the criterion of such a mental state be? 
4. The realisation of metaphor
A criterion of the right mental aiming, of a harmony in relation to one-
self, could be beauty. Beauty could be one key to the liberation from the
despotic power of metaphor; one path towards the change of metaphor,
not necessarily into its opposite, but into something else. 
This is what Plato suggests in the dialogue “Phaedrus”:
“But beauty (kallous), as I said before, shone in brilliance among those
visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most
clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight (opsis) is the sharp-
est of the physical senses, though wisdom (phrone¤sis) is not seen by
it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it
were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the
other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore
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it is most clearly seen and loveliest.”19
Beauty as a way of approaching truth that does not make you blind, or
perhaps, makes you blind to the right things. A beauty that sets your
mind right (“orthos logos”, the right thought). But beauty seems to be
that which is seen in the place of something else. However, “in place
of” does not mean “instead” (“anti-”, “stellvertretend”) invoking an un-
real world of shadows that we must be content with. Beauty is the way
to perceive that matches sight. Seeing answers to beauty, as if it had a
voice. Or perhaps: the sound of seeing is beauty.
But how can we identify Beauty, when we are not allowed to trans-
late one word into others?
Because it seems practicable, no matter how strenuous, to point to
gestures, approaching choreographies, in which the right actions usual-
ly moved themselves. So, beauty opens a horizon to the observer, or in-
vestigator, where peoples’ ways are staged like coloured silhouettes.
However, through the concept of beauty we cannot be invested with a
deduced framework of more and more minute concepts getting us
closer and closer to a concrete phenomenon, called “the beautiful”.
There is no grid, no network, only a dynamics of intangible emotions
leading to an overwhelming, or it is perhaps just an “accurate”, ques-
tion. 
We can only visit the place.
So it is the task of the philosopher to seek honestly for the signifi-
cance of a concept, the meaning of which so many seem to know. To
seek for a logic of intention and extension that fails, for a concept that
is abolished in the very process of its application. Beauty, then, might
seem to hide itself behind the surface of what the fashionable, concept-
ual designers use to call “aesthetics”, but it is certainly not found there.
More probable it shall seek refuge among the unimpressive, find a shel-
ter in the very small things, or hide among the herringbone patterns of
everything, grey, anonymous, but with a soft, hardly perceptible radi-
ance, like jade inside velvet. But it can be seen by the alert eye. An
immanent brilliancy hardly traceable as anything else but a soft smoul-
dering, a spark blown off from the worldfire.
Not Vermeer, not LeCourbusier, not Karl Lagerfeld, not in those
forms, but behind them. Not even Phaidias or Michelangelo, nor Botti-
celli or Hundertwasser, not even Moore or Giacometti, but behind
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them. Ceci (la beauté), n’est pas la beauté. Not even Goya nor Picasso,
nor “New Brutalism”, not even with the mask of the hideous. They all
manifest the power of the metaphor through their elaborate articulation
of a style, because the phenomenon of style must necessarily be meta-
phorical by the figurative anticipation of the figure - as far as style
incorporates the gesture of indicating (with the index, deiknymi).
So beauty summons the philosopher. To invent her as a state of mind
shared between seeing and the seen. To look for a field of genuine
expression where the thing and the mind of the body act in the same
way.
In this acting, an acting out, they seem to obey the same urge.
5. A language of the heart
In a lecture in Odense, some years ago, Hans-Georg Gadamer once said
that the reality of language is in singing, in the intonation, and that the
reality of intonation is in the dance. Could music then, be the proper
realisation of metaphor? Its antidote, and its new awakening? After all,
it does not keep referring to another dimension of language games’
semantics. It stops the transference by transforming the heart of stone to
the genuine language of the heart - as Schiller spoke of in “Wallen-
stein”. This would be the idea of Arthur Schopenhauer. The realisation
of metaphor, and hence, of the concept of denotation, as far as “denota-
tion” must be anticipated by intentionality, must then be in the body, but
in the body moving. “But if things which partake of motion
(kine¤seo¤s) and aim(skopon) at some particular mark pass beside
the mark...” said the Elean Stranger, as quoted above, they shall repro-
duce “disproportion”. And “disproportion” is a species of the genus
“discord”. But “discord” is not just the opposite of “harmony”, it is the
opposite of “concordia” (homonoia), of the true social emotion of mut-
uality (pathos). 
But how then, must the body move, in order to reproduce social har-
mony? Because it is the movement of the body that realises metaphor,
not the body as a “stasis”, as an object, as a thing. The body must move
in accordance(sic!) with beauty. But a beauty beyond conceptualisa-
tion. The beauty beyond conceptualisation is spontaneity. And the
mode of spontaneity is expression. 
Influential philosophers like Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty defi-
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ned the origin of language in the child’s gesture of expression. Using
the concept of Humboldt, “Articulation”, as the core function of lan-
guage, a function relatively independent of the voice(sound), we can
confront expression and articulation.20 “Articulation” then, is the
symbolic level of language encompassing the three levels of linguistic
faculties, or “three distinct relations within the proposition”, presented
by Gilles Deleuze in “Logique du sens”: “denotation”, “manifestation”,
and “signification”. Where “denotation” is “the relation of the proposi-
tion to an external state of affairs (datum); “manifestation” “concerns
the relation of the proposition to the person who speaks and expresses
himself. Manifestation therefore is presented as a statement of desires
and beliefs which correspond to the proposition. Desires and beliefs are
causal references, not associations.” And where, finally, “significa-
tion”, is “a question of the relation of the word to universal or general
concepts, and of syntactic connections to the implications of the con-
cept.” And Deleuze continues:
“From the standpoint of signification, we always consider the ele-
ments of the proposition as “signifying” conceptual implications
capable of referring to other propositions, which serve as premises to
the first.”21
The concepts of “signification” must, of course, be the level of meta-
phorical reference. And the attempts at realising the metaphor would
fail at the level of “denotation” - as was showed -, but, less obvious, on
the level of “manifestation” too. 
When metaphor cannot be realised through “manifestation”, it is due
to the fact that desires and beliefs have to be interpreted too, and, hence,
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20 Following Humboldt, writing as a media does only need the sound and gestures as
an intermediary, demonstrated by the ability of the deaf-mute to read and to lip-read.
Hence, language can liberate itself from the sound, if necessary. This marks the auton-
omy of the level of articulation. This autonomy is needed in order to manifest a “defi-
nite significance”, because “die Darstellung eines Gedachten macht allein den articuli-
erten Laut aus, und es lässt sich nichts andres angeben, um seinen Unterschied auf der
einen Seite vom thierischen Geschrei, auf der andren vom musikalischen Ton zu
bezeichnen.” (Paragraf 10). “Expression, on the contrary, cannot escape voice and
gestures, in short, the body. It does not incorporate “die Gewalt des Geistes über die
Sprachwerkzeuge,”. Wilhelm von Humboldt: Über die Verschiedenheit des Menschli-
chen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistigen Entwicklung des Menschenge-
schlechts.” Fakimile-print after the First Edition. Bonn: Ferd. Dümlers Verlag 1968. 
21 Gilles Deleuze: The Logic of Sense. Transl. by M. Lester. New York: Columbia
University Press 1990 (1969). p.12-14.
put into words.
Deleuze admits that himself when saying: 
“Desire is the internal causality of an image with respect to the
existence of the object or the corresponding state of affairs. Correla-
tively, belief is the anticipation of the object or state of affairs, insofar
as its existence must be produced by an external causality.”(ibid.).
“Images” as well as “anticipation” are semantic entities of the cogniti-
ve system, implying conceptualisation through words and intentions.
Contrary to these three levels of articulation one can find expres-
sion. “Expression” is a gesture that refers to itself. It does not fall victim
to any mime ¤sis in the Aristotelian sense (Poetics). It does not refer to
a personal dimension of inner urges, needs, or notions in the shape of
images. Neither does it anticipate a grid of concepts, nor any fram-
ework, be it synchronic or diachronic, in order to realise a significance.
On the contrary: it enforces the one listening to invent a meaning that
can only be his. One might claim, with caution, that such a process
would be the opposite of interpretation, of the hermeneutic effort,
because this effort must always be directed towards the message, be a
“herme¤ neuein”, an effort of translation.  
Merleau-Ponty says the following about expression as the founda-
tion of meaning:
“Mais déjà, avec notre premier geste orienté, les rapports infinis de
quelqu’un avec sa situation avaient envahi notre médiocre planète et
ouvert à notre conduite un champ inépuisable. Toute perception, toute
action qui la suppose, bref toute usage humain de corps est déjà
expression primordiale, - non pas ce travail dérivé qui substitue à
l’exprimé des signes donnés par ailleurs avec leur sens et leur règle
d’emploi, mais l’opération première qui d’abord constitue les signes
en signes, fait habiter en eux l’exprimé par la seule éloquence de leur
arrangement et de leur configuration, implante un sens dans ce qui
n’en avait pas, et qui donc, loin de s’épuiser dans l’instant où elle a
lieu, inaugure un ordre, fonde une institution ou une tradition...”22
The act of primordial expression anticipates any articulation. One could
also speak about a “mimetic arch-gesture” here, a gesture that does not
preclude the word as in the pantomime, but waits for it. However, the
123
22 The essay “Le language indirect et les voix du silence” from the collection of essays:
“Signes”, Paris: Gallimard, 1960. p.84.
subject of mime¤sis here is unknown to the body, it is the very mimet-
ic movement itself.23 The Stoics thought in this way, too:
“Die Vertreter der Ansicht, dass die Sprache natürlichen Ursprungs
sei, machten schon in Platos Zeit geltend, man dürfe die Nachahmung
durch die Stimme nichts anders beurteilen als die Gesten, mit denen
der Mensch ohne Worte die Dinge bezeichnet. Einen unmittelbaren
Zusammenhang zwischen beiden stellte auch die Stoa fest (...)”24
But perhaps the real foundation of meaning does rest on one figure
more, the figure of silence, a silence arrived at after the event of mean-
ing by hand of articulation?
Derrida suggests in his essay “Sauf le nom”,25 dealing with the
topic of “negative theology”, that there might exist two languages of
mysticism, one referring to an original experience, and another, exhibit-
ing the character of a string of words only, an absolute formalisation,
with neither denotative, manifestative nor significative qualities. To
chant this litany of non-sense - a meditation at the level of sound only -
might lead to “speaking oneself” into the possession of an unknown
sense. This movement, disentangling the kerygma from the kenosis, the
latter being the Christian word for the notion of a “personal dimension”,
a “human dimension” of experience in Christ, of “ein Menschwerden”,
might not only reveal something about mysticism to us, but also some-
thing about the opposite of the metaphor.
6. Music and metaphor
Let me summarise: the opposite of metaphorical articulation is a genu-
ine expression unable to be interpreted inside the network of semantics
laid down by language games, and their possible meta-languages. Any-
how, this mode of expression cannot be totally empty of meaning, it
must in some way relate to our cognitive, conative and emotional
system. The way such a mode of expression relates to us can only be
through our body as a place where sense happens. It could itself be
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23 See my book “Secunda philosophia”. Copenhagen: Samfundslitteratur. August
1999. 
24 Max Pohlenz: Die Stoa. Geschichte einer Bewegung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht. 1992. p.41.
25 J. Derrida: Sauf le nom. Editions Galileé. 1993.
metaphorically expressed as the transformation of a heart of stone into
a heart of passion.
The obvious aporia here, in speaking about the non-metaphorical by
hand of metaphor, can be dissolved, however, because there is a mode
in which metaphor itself is conquered by expression: music. Music,
thus, can be seen as the alternative media of articulation in relation to
metaphor as a deeply rooted linguistic mode, as the secret of the
pho ¤ne ¤, of voice; or even as the fusion of the levels of articulation
and expression.26
This is not meant to elevate music to an ideal-language, nor to a uni-
versal language, but to point to the fact that in music something is at
play, transgressing performance. Music might testify to a core of spea-
king, in speaking, to a power in the living voice in which significance is
carried from person to person in a way beyond conceptualisation. Of
course, already mentioned philosophers like Lipps, Løgstrup and Mer-
leau-Ponty were aware of that, but postmodernism seems sometimes to
have forgotten it when it transforms a necessity into a virtue by raising
writing, and hence, text, to the centre of language. In the text metaphor
shall dominate, of course, because articulation dominates, and is pres-
sed to its limit.
If this necessity of writing and text consists in the computer and the
information society, then it might be of some use to compare the voice
hidden behind the text on the screen, and the voices hidden within the
text of the libretto.27
However, such a comparison, and the implied criticism of the infor-
mation society, is condemned to balance at the edge of the banal, the
more the computer becomes integrated into koine ¤ aisthe ¤sis, into
common sense through its promotion to the dominant techne ¤.
7. The power of metaphor after all, event, narrative, and
the computer
The libretto is realised through the performance - which, of course, can
be recorded and thus kept - but this performance is meant to be unique.
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26 We do not need to concede that music functions figuratively here as a non-metap-
horical field.
27 I do not involve the phenomenon of a libretto available on the computer. It shall not
contribute to a deepenening of the matter.
This implies that the meaning that it passes on to us shall keep a fracti-
on of the invisible and inaudible. The art of the director can be inter-
preted, but the experience of the event is the final judge. Expression, so
to speak, overrules articulation. Could that be true about the dialogue,
too? 
The composer rarely makes up his own libretto totally on his own -
with exceptions like Wagner, of course - so he accompanies his own
words, reinforcing the function of intonation in speech, because he has
to conquer the words from another, make them into his own. So, it is,
and it is not, the composer that speaks. He incorporates the concord of
speech, testifies to the social passion. Because his body is present in the
voices, he can withdraw, hovering like a gesture always already inter-
preted by the hearts, and hence, making interpretation by thought super-
fluous.
You can ask: shall it be said in this way, with this emphasis? You can
ask: must I sing it like that? You can say: must he really move in that
way. These modes are about the secrets of expression, no doubt.
In comparing the libretto to the dialogue it is important to notice that
as far as the dialogue relates to a libretto, this cannot appear, of course,
as already written, but must be emerging during speech. However, in
searching for the words, and we do actually search for words, be it in
our own mind, or “out there”, between us, we can to a certain degree be
said to create a libretto. However, this libretto must in some way have
been written already, this is the secret of the real dialogue: because it
wraps itself around a story, binding us together in its transcendent
immanence within the lines.  
Even if Aristotle’s three parameters of the metaphor are presented in
his Art of Rhetoric, and not in his Poetics, they might refer to the hid-
den narrative, however, through the example of the forensic speech, in
a wider sense, to which the narrative naturally belongs28. The narrative
invests the moral perspective in any dialogue: 
“And the narrative should be of a moral character, and in fact it will be
so, if we know what effects this.”29
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28 Art of Rhetoric, III, xiii, 3,5, and III, xvi.
29 Ibid. III, xvi, 8
Aristotle mentions the “Socratic dialogues” here as an example of the
moral, narrative structure. Furthermore he adds: 
“the narrative should draw upon what is emotional by the introduction
of such of its accompaniments as are well known, and of what is spe-
cially characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary...”30
And he continues: 
“Such details produce persuasion because, being known to the hearer,
they become tokens of what he does not know.”
A few lines later he says: 
“And you should at once introduce yourself and your adversary as
being of a certain character, that the hearers may regard you or him as
such; but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is perfectly clear from
the example of messengers; we do not yet know what they are going
to say, but nevertheless we have an inkling of it.”31
Finally Aristotle comments on the die ¤ge ¤sis: 
“If there is anything incredible, you should immediately promise both
to give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the judgement of any
whom the hearers approve;”32
It is rather obvious that there is a game here, behind the words of Ari-
stotle. The narrative is given the parameters of the metaphor earlier
presented by him: the foreign air, enigma and beauty, and these para-
meters are questioned. Persuade the hearer through that which he does
not know, emphasise emotion, refer to a message not yet deciphered,
and present yourself in order to anticipate any alternative presentation
by the mouths of others. Control the emotional impact of speech, i.e. the
moral and the beauty, but do not play too openly with the enigma of
words.
So, while you are speaking, you are creating a metaphor comprising
both the very event of speaking, and the causes and ends of this event.
This clandestine metaphor might be called the “libretto of the dia-
logue”. It has got many layers between the spoken and the unspoken,
but it definitely plays with the notion of “an author”, because it applies
an idea of sense, of meaning, of significance, and even of history itself,
127
30 III, xvi, 10.
31 III, xvi, 10-11.
32 III, xvi, 11.
comprising the narrative inherent in the libretto present now in all its
absence. 
Then, expression, pathos, passion, render to us through their ways of
occupying speech a new meaning of metaphor, creating in the very
same movement the character of he who speaks, his right to speaking,
the story in which he speaks, and about which he speaks, as an enigma.
Speech invokes Otherness, transferring itself as a token of a foreign air,
of Otherness (“heteros” in the language from Plato’s dialogue “Par-
menides”), it presents us to an enigma, the enigma of the event of the
dialogue, and - if spoken beautifully - it keeps us caught within the ten-
sion of this limit, enforcing us to balance on the borderline, to acknowl-
edge ourselves as the secret: flesh that speaks. I, who speak, become the
metaphor of a meaning never in its totality accessible to me. This sho-
uld be obvious alone from the fact that every language in which we
speak of our mental space has to be metaphorical - as testified so stri-
kingly by Freud, Jung, and Lacan, but by the philosophers too (what is
the datum of a “transcendental subject”, anyhow?) And even memories
of events have got this metaphorical character, as Proust was so aware
of, but in forming a metaphorical bond abolished in every moment by
the presence of my flesh, and realised in every moment by my percep-
tion, being the application of memory through experience. Hence,
experience becomes, through memory, an ethical concept.
The relation between the author and his work shall, of course, exem-
plify this more than so much else. So, the performance, the event, be it
of a libretto, or of the hidden score of the emerging everyday dialogue,
can be seen as the realisation of a metaphor which I am. A metaphor
called “Mozart”! A metaphor called “Ole Fogh Kirkeby”! However,
this metaphor is never deferred, because I enact it through pathos. I
incorporate it, because it is my being here, my haecceitas.33
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33 It is, of course, very complicated whether, or better, when, the personal pronouns do
refer figuratively. Probably the use of “I” is genuinely metaphorical in every aspect of
self-reference, but only potentially figurative in connection with verbs of acting or suf-
fering. The “You”, however, is often related to an aggressive, social, use of metaphor -
as Hegel showed in “Phänomenologie des Geistes” with the interchangeable concepts
of “master” and “slave”. We have to liberate the “You” from metaphor, as suggested by
Martin Buber and Emmanuel Lévinas. The personal name, anyhow, is always metap-
horical, referring to deeds done and the range of actions to be expected. Unless the
name is shaped so as to shake the figurative off its shoulders: J h w h.  
On the contrary the computer delivers to us textual universes where
nothing must be concealed. As a media of personal messages, brute
facts, knowledge, entertainment and advertisement, its way of refer-
ring, its “interpretant system” in the concepts of Peirce, must be abso-
lutely overt, i.e. its gestures of significance cannot be to any “Other-
ness”. It refers the reader to figures of permanent reference, because it
either invokes the truth of the “datum”, the truth of (inter-)action, or the
truth of consensus. But this double consent can only be figurative in so
far as it defers the final answer, addressing a person constructed throu-
gh an inference, the last resort of which is the platitudes. This danger-
ous play with an eternal presence of the person outside his flesh, this
impious attempt to fill the voids of silence in speech, this “anabasis”,
this raid into the continent of the invisible, sum up in the fashion word
“construction”. Construction is very far from “invention”, because
“intuition”(epibole¤ ) and fantasy(prole¤ psis) presuppose experience,
and experience is a clandestine libretto.34
The enigmatic character of the computer, the concealed messages,
the hidden attempts at power, is a threat. The enigmatic character of the
dialogue is the only opportunity to freedom left, the only resort of
Otherness in a world devoted to textual structures deferring themselves
through a continuity of distance, carried by the intensification of digital
holes called “persons”, verging on Nothing. A worrying aesthetic turn
of experience disguised as the pasilogy of the internet: a  thrilling rever-
sal of the “natura abhorret vacuum”. An immense palimpsest, a night-
mare of repetitions with minor and minor differences. Let me remind
about Plato’s warning in the “Sophist” with the words of Parmenides:
“Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is(einai me¤onta);
But keep your mind from this way of investigation.”35
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34 These two Greek concepts, the latter from Stoicism, presuppose an epistemology
where perception has to be transformed into an experience controlled by logos. Hence,
experience becomes an ethical concept - which of course is seen both in Don Giovanni
and in Die Zauberflöte.
35 Op. cit. 237A.
And let me conclude with Plato’s superbly ironical comment:
“Stranger: “And he who says not something, must quite necessarily
say absolute nothing.
Theaetetus: “Quite necessarily. 
Stranger: Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but
says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say
“not-being”(me¤ on) does not speak at all?”36
The realized metaphor is silence.
.
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